This paper proposes a novel explanation of the vast empirical evidence showing that output and prices react asymmetrically to monetary policy innovations over contractions and expansions in the business cycle. We use VAR techniques to show that monetary policy exerts stronger e¤ects on the U.S. GDP during contractionary phases, as compared to expansionary ones. As to prices, their response is not statistically di¤erent across di¤erent cyclical stages. We show that these facts are consistent with a New Neoclassical Synthesis model based on the assumption that households' utility partly depends on deviations of their consumption from a reference level below which aversion to loss is displayed. In line with the theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , losses in consumption utility loom larger than gains. This implies state-dependent degrees of real rigidity and elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption that generate competing e¤ects on the responses of output and in ‡ation following a monetary innovation. The key predictions of the model are in line with the data. We then explore the state-dependent trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilization that naturally arises in this context. Greater elasticity of in ‡ation to real activity during expansionary stages of the cycle promotes a stronger degree of policy activism in the response to the expected rate of in ‡ation under discretion, compared to what is otherwise prescribed during contractions.
Introduction
Since the seminal work by Mitchell (1927) , considerable e¤ort has been devoted to the study of asymmetries in macroeconomic time series. Graham (1930) , Keynes (1936) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have then stimulated a vast debate on the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy. Widespread empirical evidence has been produced in support of the view that monetary policy exerts asymmetric e¤ects on output and prices with respect to the economic conditions as well as the size and direction of the policy action. 1 Such e¤ects have important implications not only for the way we think about the macroeconomy, but also for the conduct of economic policy.
In this paper we focus on asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy over contractionary and expansionary phases of the business cycle. Contractions (expansions) are intended as periods in which the cycle moves from its peak (trough) to the trough (peak). In this respect, two major regularities have emerged (see, e.g., Weise, 1999) . On the one hand, monetary policy innovations have greater impact on output during negative stages of the cycles. On the other hand, changes in the monetary policy stance exert stronger e¤ects on prices during expansionary phases. These facts motivate our study. We put forward a novel potential explanation of the cyclical asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy, based on households displaying reference-dependent preferences in consumption. We show how embedding prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) in a popular macroeconomic framework can robustly account for the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy on real activity and prices.
Reference-dependent preferences have received strong attention in the literature on asset pricing. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) have successfully employed prospect theory to explain the behavior of asset returns and resolve a number of quantitative asset pricing puzzles. A key feature of the model of Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) is that households care about gains and losses in …nancial wealth. By contrast, Koszegi and Rabin (2009) assume that households care about gains and losses in consumption. This assumption is empirically supported by Yogo (2008) and Rosenblatt-Wisch (2008) .
The novelty of this paper is to embed reference-dependent utility in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. We set aside asset pricing implications and focus on the transmission of monetary policy on output and in ‡ation. Our modeling strategy consists of assuming that consumers'utility partly depends on the deviation of their current consumption from the previous period's average consumption in the economy, which represents the habit reference level below which loss-aversion is displayed. In line with the theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1991) , losses in consumption utility resonate more than gains.
Two key mechanisms are identi…ed. First, during contractions changes in the real rate of interest exert stronger impact on output through an increase in the elasticity of intertemporal 1 Three main regularities have emerged: (i) money does a¤ect output strongly when monetary policy is restrictive and raises in ‡ation when it is expansive; (ii) the e¤ects of money on output is greater during the contractionary phases of business cycles and their impact on in ‡ation is greater during expansionary phases; (iii) if prices are sticky, then only negative shocks a¤ect output. Here are some noteworthy contributions: Falk (1986) , Cover (1992) , Thoma (1994) , Karras (1996) , Acemoglu and Scott (1997) , Weise (1999) , Senda (2001) , Ravn and Sola (2004) , Peersman and Smets (2005) , Lo and Piger (2005) . substitution between current and future consumption. This property of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution has been widely explored in the literature on asset pricing (see, e.g., Yogo, 2008) . Second, accounting for reference-dependent preferences in a general equilibrium setting implies a state-dependent marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure that can be related to …rms'real marginal cost, so that equilibrium in the labor market holds.
As a direct implication, the pass-through of real activity to prices depends on the level of consumption relative to its reference level and is lower during contractionary states as opposed to expansionary ones. Both features of the model are compatible with output being more adversely a¤ected by monetary policy innovations during contractionary phases. Concurrently, in ‡ation responses to monetary innovations are somewhat insulated by the higher responsiveness of real activity during negative growth cycles through an increased degree of real rigidity in the labor market.
We explore the state-dependent trade-o¤ that naturally arises in this context. Optimal policy under discretion imposes a stronger degree of reactiveness to the expected rate of in ‡ation in the expansionary state as compared to the contractionary one. Consequently, in the expansionary state monetary policy can reach a policy frontier which is otherwise unattainable under the contractionary one. On the one hand, assuming an aggressive monetary stance on in ‡ation during contractions, i.e. a policy that aims at completely o¤setting ‡uctuations in in ‡ation, incurs into relatively higher costs in terms of output volatility. On the other hand, attaching increasing importance to output volatility gradually leads to similar costs in terms of in ‡ation volatility across di¤erent states. Most importantly, reducing in ‡ation variability by the same amount and from the same level in the two cyclical stages entails higher costs in terms of output variability during negative growth cycles.
It is important to recall that the macroeconomic literature has proposed a variety of mechanisms acting from both the supply and the demand side of the economy and capable to account for di¤erent types of asymmetry. 2 Among others, Lo and Piger (2005) and Peersman and Smets (2005) suggest that the balance-sheet channel is consistent with larger e¤ects of monetary policy on output during unfavorable growth states. However, this mechanism implies an analogous ampli…cation (attenuation) of monetary policy innovations on both prices and real activity during contractionary (expansionary) phases, thus contradicting the empirical evidence. Di¤erent potential factors have also been proposed to account for other sources of asymmetry in the monetary transmission, such as non-linearities in investment (Bertola and Caballero, 1994) , patterns of entry and exit from a given market under uncertainty about pro…t perspectives (Dixit, 1989) , nominal rigidities in the labor and goods market (Ball and Mankiw, 1995) , learning and information aggregation (Chalkley and Lee, 1998) , convex aggregate supply (Devereux and Siu, 2007) . 3 However, a mechanism capable to account for the joint reaction of output and prices to a monetary policy innovation over di¤erent stages of the business cycle still has to emerge.
We provide an alternative based on behavioral mechanisms that have found wide empirical and experimental support in the literature (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, and Schwartz, 1997) .
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 reports some empirical evidence from a reduced form state-dependent VAR on the cyclical transmission of monetary policy; Section 3 details the theoretical framework we propose to account for these facts; Section 4 details the qualitative and quantitative features of the framework under scrutiny and provides intuition on the key mechanisms generating asymmetry in the responses of output and prices over di¤erent cyclical phases; Section 5 discusses the main policy implications of allowing for loss-averse preferences over consumption in our general equilibrium setting; the last section concludes.
Empirical Evidence
McKay and Reis (2008) have recently revived the interest in asymmetric ‡uctuations over different stages of the cycle. These are to be intended as phases of expansion and contraction in economic activity and are referred to as "growth cycles", in contrast with the "classical cycles" (Zarnowitz, 1992) . The aim of this section is to document the e¤ects of monetary policy on output and prices over positive and negative growth cycles. Two main results are highlighted:
(i) …rst, the response of output is greater during contractionary phases and signi…cantly smaller during expansionary ones; (ii) second, despite the ampli…cation of output responses during negative growth cycles, prices are invariantly a¤ected by a monetary policy innovation over di¤erent stages of the cycle. Asymmetries in the responses of either output or prices (primarily the former) to monetary policy innovations have widely been documented in the existing literature, although the analysis of their joint behavior has been somewhat disregarded. 4 Since Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992) , it has become common practice to implement vector autoregression (VAR) methods to identify and measure the e¤ects of monetary policy innovations on macroeconomic variables. The monetary policy shock is identi…ed as the unforecasted innovation of the policy instrument (for a survey, see Christiano et al., 1999) . We follow this literature and employ a piecewise-linear structural VAR, distinguishing between contractionary and expansionary phases of the business cycle. We estimate the following monthly VAR model for the U.S. economy:
where Y t is a vector of endogenous variables, " Y t is a vector of error terms that are assumed to be white noise and I =0 when the economy is expanding, while I =1 when the economy is in a contractionary phase of the cycle. We characterize contractions (expansions) as periods in which the output gap moves its peak (trough) to the trough (peak). The vector Y t includes the industrial production index (IPI), the consumer price index (CPI), commodities prices and the federal funds rate. All variables but the policy rate are in natural logarithms. 5 A …rst problem in this type of empirical investigation relates to the determination of an indicator of contractions/expansions. We consider the month-to-month rate of growth of the CBO output gap series, i.e. the percentage deviation of real GDP from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce potential output. To identify growth cycles, we apply a four months one-sided MA …lter 4 Weise (1999 to the output gap series, so as to avoid the inclusion of those switches that do not last more than a quarter. 6 Figure 1 reports the contraction bands consistent with our approach against the NBER recession bands and the output-gap series. Clearly, all NBER recession episodes fall within the contractionary phases implied by the output gap indicator.
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The VAR features a constant, a time trend and six lags, and is estimated over the time It must be stressed that the F-tests on the linear reduced-form VAR do not map on a oneto-one basis into a test on the corresponding impulse-response functions, as these are non-linear combinations of the estimated coe¢ cients in the VAR. To assess the signi…cance of cyclicaldependence in the impulse-response functions we construct a test on the maximum di¤erence, in absolute value, between the impulse responses of each variable in the cycle-dependent VAR 6 Taking a one-sided …lter allows us to avoid simultaneity problems that potentially arise when data are splitted in accordance with the current state of the cycle. Results are robust to alternative indicator functions that select data based on previous period's cyclical phase. Our methodology is analogous to that employed by McKay and Reis (2008) . They primarily rely on the algorithm developed by Bry and Boschan (1971) to date turning points in the cycle. 7 The choice of this lag speci…cation is consistent with the Schwarz information criterion (BIC). However, results are robust to alternative lag speci…cations. 8 The …gure also displays the 90% con…dence bands obtained through the other percentile bootstrap method (Hall, 1992) . 9 As …rst noted by Sims (1992) , empirical studies employing structural VARs generally detect positive and signi…cant (on impact) responses of the price level to a monetary policy shock. Conventional dynamic general equilibrium frameworks cannot replicate such puzzling evidence. Sims (1992) and Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) suggest that this fact could be due to an omitted variables bias. By contrast, Barth and Ramey (2000) point to the cost channel as a possible "structural" explanation of this …nding. In this section we focus on asymmetries in the response of prices to monetary innovations over di¤erent phases of the cycle, regardless of the direction of the response. Whereas this mechanism has drawn considerable attention in literature on asset pricing, which has been mainly aimed at reconciling the consumption-based CAPM with the empirical behavior of asset returns, little e¤ort has been made to explore its relevance in the macroeconomic literature. Some applications to price setting (Heidhues and Koszegi, 2005) and consumption theory (Koszegi and Rabin, 2009 ) have recently been proposed. However, to the best of our knowledge, we provide the …rst contribution exploring the role of loss-aversion in consumption utility within a dynamic general equilibrium setting.
A Model of Reference-dependent Consumption Choices
This section sets out the structure of the model we put forward to explain the empirical evidence documented in the previous section. The supply side is populated by monopolistically competitive …rms producing intermediate goods and a perfectly competitive sector of production that sells a composite of consumption goods. As to the demand side, there is a continuum of atomistic consumers, indexed by i 2 [0; 1].
Demand Side
Households have preferences de…ned over leisure (1 N it ), consumption (C it ) and gains and losses in consumption relative to its reference level (X it ). They maximize the expected present discounted value of their utility:
where is the intertemporal discount factor and is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006) and Yogo (2008) , we consider a general class of reference-dependent preferences: 11
where V (C) is a neoclassical utility function: this is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave for all C > 0.
( ) is a gain-loss function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , that is, utility derived from the deviation of consumption utility V (C) from its reference level, V (X). 12 Preferences that depend on a reference level of consumption have psychological foundations in hedonic adaptation (see Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999) . 13 In line with Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin (1999), we assume that ( ) satis…es some properties. Speci…cally: (i) (Z) is continuous for all Z 0 s, twice di¤erentiable for Z 6 = 0 and
> 1, where
00 (Z) 0 for Z > 0 and 00 (Z) 0 for Z < 0. Properties (i) and (ii) imply monotonicity,
i.e. utility is strictly increasing in the magnitude of the gain. Loss-aversion, i.e. the impact of a loss is greater than that of an equally sized gain, is captured by (iii) for small stakes and (iv) for large stakes. These properties imply that when the representative consumer is in a bad state, she will become more sensitive to the relative consumption level than when she is in a good state. Finally, (v) is referred to as diminishing sensitivity, i.e. the marginal e¤ect of a gain or a loss diminishes with its magnitude. To account for these properties we use an exponential gain-loss utility (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005) :
where determines the degree of diminishing sensitivity and is a parameter that indexes the degree of loss-aversion. Note that for = 0 we obtain a linear gain-loss function. Otherwise, (4) retains the property to be smooth at the reference point. 14 As to the reference consumption level, we assume that consumers evaluate the distance between consumption utility and a function of the average consumption in the previous period:
1 1 For the time being, and without loss of generality, we describe reference-dependent preferences by reporting variables without subscripts.
1 2 In the remainder we will assume, without loss of generality, logarithmic consumption utility. 1 3 Koszegi and Rabin (2009) have envisaged a model of reference-dependent consumption choices. However, their focus is on the role of bad news about future consumption vs. good ones in the determination of current consumption choices. Other applications of this model, such as Yogo (2008) , are mainly focused on asset pricing.
1 4 This property is particularly useful in the perspective of linearizing the model economy.
X it = C t 1 , where 2 [0; 1] indexes the importance of external habit formation. 15 Therefore we follow Yogo (2008) , embedding habit formation in a reference-dependent model. 16 External habit formation in consumption is usually introduced to account for the empirical persistence in the consumption process (Smets and Wouters, 2007) . Unlike internal habit formation, this mechanism implies that households fail to internalize the externality of their own consumption on the utility of other households.
To gain further intuition on the structure of reference-dependent preferences over consumption, Figure 3 plots (4) and its …rst order derivative for di¤erent values of Z (x-axis) and (we set = 1). As predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , loss aversion re ‡ects the widely observed behavior that agents are more sensitive to losses than gains, resulting in a gain-loss function that is steeper in the …rst case (see the left-hand panel of Figure 3 ).
Insert Figure 3 here
As to the intertemporal budget constraint, we assume that the i th consumer, whose labor is remunerated at the real wage W t , enters period t with cash holdings M it , B it 1 one-period nominal bonds that pay R t 1 gross interest (1 + i t 1 ). Moreover, she receives the ‡ow of dividends from a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers ( it ) and a lump sum transfer from the monetary authority (T it ):
Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to individual consumption (C it ) and taking the consumption reference level as external to the i th household returns the following Euler equation:
where
is an indicator function according to which the functional form of consumers'marginal utility depends on their gain-loss pro…le. The expected marginal rate of substitution between C it and N it reads as:
1 5 Since the work of Abel (1990) , external habit formation has become known as "catching up with the Joneses". We use the external habit de…nition in the spirit of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . 1 6 The model o¤ers a parsimonious framework to think about risk aversion and loss aversion. Risk aversion refers to the curvature of consumption utility, which determines the household's behavior for large gambles. Loss aversion refers to the magnitude of marginal utility for losses relative to gains, which determines the household's behavior for small gambles.
Equations (6) and (8) are paramount to understand how cyclical asymmetries in transmission of monetary policy may arise in our model. Equation (6) regulates the intertemporal substitution between current and future consumption. A closer look at this relationship allows us to provide an intuition on the key mechanism at work in the dynamics of consumption. Households are more prone to bring consumption forward if they perceive that current and expected future consumption are both below the reference level (i.e., s t = s t+1 = B). For s t = B the curvature of the reference-dependent utility function is lower than that observed under s t = A, thus implying a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Consequently, the marginal impact of the (real) interest rate on current consumption is also higher, relative to the alternative scenario, which implies that an unforecasted monetary policy innovation will have a greater impact on current consumption during negative growth cycles. Concurrently, equation (8) governs the intratemporal substitution between consumption and leisure. For a given jV (C) V (X)j, the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption is higher when V (C) < V (X).
Under these circumstances households are more willing to cut on their leisure so as to increase consumption in the same period, compared to what happens when V (C) V (X). In a general equilibrium perspective, as labor is employed by a monopolistically competitive sector, we should expect a lower elasticity of …rms'real marginal cost w.r.t. consumption (output). This translates into an attenuation of the impact of real activity on in ‡ation when consumption is decreasing relative to its reference level, compared to what happens when it expands.
Supply Side
The …nal good is produced by perfectly competitive …rms and requires the assembly of a continuum of intermediate goods, indexed by j 2 [0; 1], via the following technology:
Pro…t maximization leads to the demand function:
is the price index consistent with the …nal good producer earning null pro…ts. Total production equals aggregate consumption.
A continuum of …rms produce intermediate goods. Each …rm employs labor under a constant-returns-to scale technology:
where Z t is a log-stationary total factor productivity shifter.
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) , we assume that …rms set prices according to a variant of the Calvo (1983) speci…cation. The probability that a …rm can re-optimize its price in each period is 1 !. Firms that cannot re-optimize simply follow a lagged-in ‡ation indexation rule:
Optimizing …rms maximize their expected stream of future pro…ts, subject to (9) and (10). The cost minimization problem is speci…ed as follows:
The resulting real marginal cost is RM C t = W t =Z t .
The Monetary Authority
The government sets the nominal rate of interest in accordance with a standard instrumental rule:
where t denotes the gross rate of in ‡ation and t is a trend-stationary monetary innovation. 17 We assume that the government adheres to this rule via open market operations, which are …nanced by means of money transfers to the households, such that any de…cits are equal to
Assuming a symmetric policy function to stabilize output and in ‡ation represents a convenient way to close the model at this stage and focus on the e¤ects of introducing referencedependent preferences into an otherwise standard framework. In Section 5 we focus on the monetary policy implications of this modeling assumption and formulate some policy prescriptions that account for the presence of reference-dependent preferences.
Model Solution
In the framework set out above households' utility is reference-dependent, i.e. its functional form depends on whether individual consumption is above or below the reference level (which is itself determined by aggregate past consumption). Furthermore, we assume that agents do not actually observe the reference level, X t , but form beliefs on their relative position. In this respect, our assumption is similar in spirit to Veronesi (2004) , who assumes that consumers do not observe their stock of habits, but possess a probability distribution on it. Veronesi (2004) introduces the concept of "beliefs-dependent" utility function (see also Geaneakoplos et al., 1989; Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Yariv, 2002) in a pure exchange economy, emphasizing the role of aversion to "state-uncertainty", which naturally arises in this context. In our case we consider beliefs-dependent preferences with neutrality to state-uncertainty. This allows us to partial out complications that may arise from aversion to state-uncertainty.
Given the intertemporal nature of households' maximization problem, we need to specify how agents' beliefs are formed, as these will determine the relevant branch of the referencedependent utility function. We assume that agents' beliefs about their position with respect to the stock of habits, i.e. on whether they are going to be above or below the reference consumption level in future periods, evolve as an invariant Markov chain. 18 This assumption allows us to overcome the endogeneity problem arising from the fact that at any given period t agents evaluate their utility based on a state-dependent function and have to select a future consumption plan that depends on their reference consumption level, which is itself determined in the same period.
Within this setting we can cast the model in the form of a Markov Switching Rational
Expectations (MSRE) model (see Farmer, Waggoner and Zha, 2008, 2009). 19 To this end, we linearize the key equations in the neighborhood of C=X = 1 and aggregate across individuals, assuming that in a symmetric equilibrium households make identical consumption-saving decisions. 20 Conditional on their relative consumption in each period, consumers'beliefs evolve in accordance with the following transition matrix:
where q AB = Pr ( s t+1 = Aj s t = B) = 1 q AA and q BA = 1 q BB . Equilibrium dynamics depends on agents'beliefs about their relative position with respect to the stock of habits. This implies that certain parameters can vary depending on the perceived "consumption state". As agents' beliefs evolve in accordance with (14), we have a standard MSRE model and it can be shown that the Minimal State Variable (MSV) solution is a Markov Switching VAR (see Farmer, Waggoner and Zha, 2008, 2009 ).
Importantly, dealing with reference-dependent habits necessarily implies that the parameters in the equilibrium system depend on states at time t and t 1. 
which implies four states, as reported in extensive form in Appendix A: an expansionary one, a contractionary one, and two turning points. In the remainder we pose stronger emphasis on the behavior of the model economy in expansions and contractions. To this end, we will refer to the expansionary state as that indexed by E t = fA; Ag, while the contractionary one is indicated we leave for future research. At this stage of the analysis we are mainly interested in showing how the adoption of reference-dependent preferences in a model of external habit formation allows us to reproduce the asymmetric reaction of prices and quantities to a monetary innovation. 1 9 In the quantitative analysis of Section 4.2 the model is solved under the assumption that the representative agent correctly observes in which regime she is in the current period. Therefore, uncertainty pertains solely to the states she is going to be in future periods. The dynamics of the model is one where agents weight the behavioral equations for the probabilities of regarding themselves in any of the "states" of the economy. Therefore, a measurement equation relates the model to the observables. This can be written as Yt = P i } (st = ijIt 1) Yit, where } (st = ijIt 1) is the probability of being at state i in period t given the information set in the previous period. This probability is updated recursively based on the Bayes' rule (see, e.g., Liu, Waggoner and Zha, 2010) . The probability associated with each state can be thought as a set of beliefs that the representative agent associates with each state at the moment of making her consumption choice, so that the utility function is e¤ectively beliefs-dependent(see Veronesi, 2004 ) .
2 0 The di¤erence between log-variables under sticky prices and their linearized steady state is denoted by lower case letters. For further details, see Appendix A, where we report the linearized conditions for each of the four states taken separately. In Appendix B we report the model under the representation used to solve it through the generalized MSV approach developed by Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2008, 2009) , which is based on the canonical VAR representation of Sims (2002) . As discussed in Section 3.1, embedding reference-dependent preferences over consumption in a general equilibrium framework induces two major changes in the key equations describing the dynamics of real activity and prices: (i) …rst, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is state-dependent, being higher (lower) in contraction (expansion); (ii) second, a state-dependent marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure induces an attenuation of the impact of real activity on …rms' pricing behavior during contractions. The …rst property has been widely explored by Yogo (2008) . The second property is intimately connected with the role of reference-dependent preferences in a general equilibrium setting. A globally convex aggregate supply function can be envisaged in this context, which retains the property to be steeper ( ‡atter) during expansionary (contractionary) episodes. Analogous functional forms have been explored in the literature on the Phillips curve, emphasizing the role of large shocks relative to small ones for …rms'pricing behavior. 21 In this respect, the existence of menu costs can rationalize a convex aggregate supply schedule. Nonetheless, it is interesting to notice how embedding reference-dependent preferences on consumption in a general equilibrium setting allows us to provide a microfoundation that emphasizes the role of state-dependent degrees of real rigidity in the labor market equilibrium allocation, rather than nominal rigidities.
It is useful to explore these intuitions further by inspecting the linearized relationships describing the behavior of demand and supply across di¤erent states. Speci…cally, we compare the responses of output and in ‡ation to a monetary policy shock when agents "naively" expect the economy to permanently stay in either expansion or contraction. This amounts to impose, just for the time being, q AA = q BB = 1. Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) refer to the di¤erence in the dynamic responses under the model with naive vs. sophisticated consumers as the "expectation e¤ect." As explained by Davig and Leeper (2007) , such expectation e¤ect generally plays an important role in the presence of autocorrelated disturbances, which is not the case of the monetary policy innovation we envisage. To provide some useful analytical insight we also set = 0, which corresponds to a case in which households consider the deviation of their consumption utility from the utility accruing from a constant consumption reference level. In this case we implicitly look at cyclical variations in output rather than at expansions/contractions in these cyclical movements. However, analogous implications carry over to the full model. We also assume an instrumental rule whereby the Central Bank responds solely to contemporaneous in ‡ation and the output gap (i.e., r R = 0) and no indexation in the pricing process (i.e., # = 0).
The system of equations describing the model economy reads as:
where t indexes the state-dependent parameters and = (1 ! ) (1 !) (! (1 + #)) 1 . The system (16)-(18) admits the following solution under rational expectations:
where A ( t ) is a state-dependent 3 2 matrix of parameters that determines the marginal impact of the shocks on the vector of state and control variables. Let us now compare the response (on impact) of output and in ‡ation to the monetary policy shock ( t ) over expansions and contractions. As to output:
a 12
while, for in ‡ation:
These results readily provide us with some implications about the response of output and in ‡ation to a monetary innovation across the two states. These are summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 1 In the model described by equations (16)- (18) under q AA = q BB = 1 (i.e., naive agents) the absolute response of output to a monetary innovation is greater under which is always true for > 1. Recall that > 1 by de…nition.
Proposition 2 In the model described by equations (16)- (18) under q AA = q BB = 1 (i.e., naive agents) the absolute response of in ‡ation to a monetary innovation is greater under E t than under C t if and only if r Y > . It can also be shown that the response of in ‡ation conditional to the output gap response in the contractionary state is lower than that appreciated in expansion, whenever agents display loss-averse preferences. To prove this statement, it is su¢ cient to prove that:
which is always true for > 1.
First of all, note that imposing = 1 implies that ( ) is no longer reference-dependent, as its functional form is the same regardless of the value of V (C) relative to V (X). Under these circumstances a 12 C t = a 12 E t and a 22 C t = a 22 E t . Indeed, the responses of output and in ‡ation are also the same for = 1, which amounts to ruling out reference-dependent preferences.
Assuming reference-dependent preferences implies state-dependent degrees of real rigidity and elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption that potentially generate competing e¤ects on the responses of output and in ‡ation following a monetary innovation. Speci…cally, the IS schedule displays a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution in contractions as compared to expansions, as (
. This result is in line with the analysis of Yogo (2008) and solely depends on the introduction of loss aversion in households'preferences (i.e., it holds as long as > 1, which is always true, as > 1 by construction). As to the state-dependent NKPC, it is straightforward to show that
in Equation (17), meaning that the elasticity of in ‡ation to the output gap is lower in contractions. This inequality is nothing but (24), which shows that the conditional response of in ‡ation to the monetary innovation is always lower in contractions. However, this may not be enough to generate an attenuation in the absolute response of in ‡ation to a monetary innovation. To see why this is the case note that in contractions lower real rigidity in the NKPC is counteracted by a greater ampli…cation in the response of output, as predicted by Proposition 1. Therefore, the overall impact of a monetary shock on in ‡ation depends on the relative magnitude of these competing forces. We have shown that a 22 C t < a 22 E t does not hold unless the systematic policy response to the output gap (r Y ) is strong enough to overcome the ampli…cation e¤ect induced by the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply ( ). It must be stressed that, should the Central Bank be a pure in ‡ation targeter (i.e., r Y = 0), r Y > is never attained. However, it is useful to note that for r Y > 0 this condition is not unlikely to hold, if we consider the values of that have generally been calibrated. Recall that measures the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor with respect to hours worked. Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) closer to the lower bound. Kimball and Shapiro (2008) estimate this elasticity to be equal to 1, and stress that such a value is higher than most estimates previously obtained. According to Eusepi and Preston (2009) the elasticity is about 0.25. 22 In Section 4.2 we will see how considering the probability of switching between regimes as well as the full linearized model economy allows us to robustly obtain attenuation in in ‡ation responses over contractionary phases of the cycle, despite the ampli…cation of output responses.
To assess the ampli…cation/attenuation e¤ects induced by reference-dependent preferences on output and in ‡ation over di¤erent cyclical phases it is useful to inspect the following ratios, for di¤erent values of : 23 
Quantitative Analysis
To quantify the di¤erential impact of monetary policy over contractions and expansions we compute numerical solutions to the linearized model economy. To this end, we need to assign some parameter values. We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency. We set = 0:99 and = 1. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ( ) is set to 0:25, while is such that steady state consumption equals one. As to the weight of habit formation, = 0:9.
We do not have any direct empirical reference in the literature on dynamic general equilibrium models about the parameter indexing the degree of loss-aversion. We set it in accordance with 2 3 It is also worth pointing out that envisaging di¤erent values of for a given value of amounts to impose di¤erent degrees of diminishing sensitivity above and below the reference level. Speci…cally, C t < E t . This is in line with the strong form of loss aversion of Wakker and Tversky (1993) , which implies 0 ( Z) > 0 (Z), 8Z > 0. Such an assumption implies that ( ) is closer to linear for losses than gains, which is in line with the empirical …ndings, and is important to detect ampli…cation/attenuation e¤ects in the linearized economy. Otherwise, imposing the same over di¤erent states would not produce major asymmetries once we approximate the model up to a …rst order in the neighborhood of Z = 0. 2 4 To provide an intuition on why this happens it is useful to inspect Figure 3 , where the curvature of the left-hand of ( ) diminishes in , coming close to zero for high values of this parameter. the value suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , i.e. = 2:25. Nominal rigidity is such that ! = 0:66 and # = 0:5. As to the policy reaction function, we set r R = 0:7, r Y = 0:5 and r = 1:5. We assume a purely transitory monetary policy shock, with = 0:02.
As to the transition matrix, Q, we calibrate it in line with the empirical evidence reported in Section 2. We use the CBO o¢ cial output gap series and compute the average duration between the bottom of a recession and the top of an expansion. Reverse arguments apply to compute the average duration of contractionary phases. The probabilities of switching across states are then retrieved as the inverse of the duration of each phase: q AB = 0:135 and q BA = 0:163; respectively. 25 These values translate into a strong persistence of expansionary and contractionary states, whose probability is captured by the main diagonal elements of Q: a direct implication is that the analysis pursued in Section 4.1, where q AA = q BB = 1, should not be qualitatively a¤ected by introducing a non-diagonal transition matrix, at least for a purely forward-looking economy.
We are now ready to assess the impact of a monetary policy contraction on output and in ‡ation. Figure 5 reports the responses to a monetary policy shock. In each graph, the solid line corresponds to the model under the expansionary state, while the dashed line refers to the contractionary one. A note of caution is warranted at this point. The graphs are responses of the system to a monetary policy shock conditional on other shocks being set at time zero. It is a convention to report variables in log-deviation from their steady state level. As such, a contractionary monetary policy shock inevitably implies a negative output response under both regimes, and not just in the contractionary one. However, in a more general setting we could envisage a composition of shocks hitting the economy, so that the monetary shock alone is not enough to in ‡uence the realization of a certain state. Therefore, a rising rate of interest can cause a contraction in economic activity without this being in contrast with the speci…cation of the model.
Insert Figure 5 here
It is clear how the response of output is stronger during contractionary phases as opposed to expansionary ones, a result in line with the analysis of Section 4.1, which con…rms the robustness of the mechanism at work in generating asymmetric responses of real activity between positive and negative growth cycles. As to the response of in ‡ation during contractions, this is insulated from the higher responsiveness of real activity: overall, we cannot appreciate much di¤erence in in ‡ation responses over di¤erent states. 26 The model can qualitatively replicate the evidence presented in Section 2. The key mechanism works along the lines detailed above. On the one hand, when consumption is initially believed to lie below its reference level, the sensitivity of output to changes in the real rate of interest is higher, compared to the case of a perceived 2 5 We also explore the responses to a monetary contraction under the assumption that agents naively believe that a given state will last forever. These results are available, upon request, from the authors. However, as explained above, a transitory policy innovation implies no major di¤erence in the dynamic responses under the model with naive vs. sophisticated consumers.
2 6 This result is robust to alternative values of relative to rY . For rY > we commonly observe a weak attenuation of in ‡ation responses to monetary shocks taking place during contractions. Otherwise, we appreciate no major di¤erence in the response of in ‡ation between contractions and expansions for alternative parameterizations.
"expanding" consumption path. On the other hand, the response of in ‡ation is attenuated when consumers display loss aversion in consumption, as indicated by the shape of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure [Eq. (8) ] and the resulting state-dependent NKPC.
Implications for Monetary Policy
Once it is recognized that monetary policy exerts an asymmetric impact on output and, to some extent, in ‡ation, it is of obvious importance to explore how the policy maker should behave to properly account for these facts. To evaluate the policy implications of embedding reference-dependent preferences into a dynamic general equilibrium context it is useful to think about a scenario in which the monetary authority acts discretionally and takes the perceived expansionary and contractionary stages separately. 27 This is done for two main reasons. First, from a practical viewpoint, working under discretion allows us to envisage a sequence of static optimization problems. In this perspective, the Central Bank does not need to consider the probability of switching across di¤erent states. Second, from an institutional viewpoint it is hard to think about a Central Bank that makes any strictly binding commitment on its future policy action (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999) .
We employ a purely forward-looking system. Once again, this amounts to set = # = 0, thus allowing for: (i) a gain-loss function in which deviations of consumption from a constant reference level (X = 1) are weighted; (ii) no indexation in price-setting. In each period the monetary authority chooses y t and t to maximize
subject to
t+i + %y 2 t+i as given and where u t is a stationary AR(1) exogenous cost shifter with autoregressive parameter u . 28 This shock is included to account for a meaningful policy trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilization. The solution to this problem returns the well known relationship:
which means that whenever in ‡ation is above the target the Central Bank should contract output below capacity (thus implementing a leaning against the wind policy). However, allowing for loss averse preferences determines state-dependent degrees of real rigidity, captured by ( t ), 2 7 In the setup we envisage the Central Bank does not exert any control on which regime is in place at any given point in time. In this respect, policy interventions are only "modest" in their scope (see Leeper and Zha, 2003) . By contrast, consumption regimes solely depend on agents'beliefs, which are assumed to evolve exogenously. As a direct consequence the architecture of the model economy is substantially insulated from the Lucas'critique.
2 8 The welfare criterion expressed in (26) is widely used to capture the stabilization objective of the central bank over the target variables t and yt. However, under reference-dependent utility we could envisage a statedepenedent welfare criterion that mimics households'preferences.
that alter the nature of the trade-o¤ between output and in ‡ation stabilization depending on the perceived deviation of consumption from its reference level:
It is evident how, for a given level of above-the-target in ‡ation, the Central Bank does not need to contract output in the contractionary state as much as it should do in the expansionary one. Recall that in the contractionary state the real interest rate has a much greater impact on real activity, while inducing only moderate e¤ects on in ‡ation. Within this setting we can derive the optimal state-dependent interest rate rule under discretion:
and it can be shown that
Therefore, the optimal policy under discretion imposes a higher degree of reactiveness to the expected rate of in ‡ation in the expansionary state as compared to the contractionary one.
A useful way to illustrate the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilization implied by the model is to construct the corresponding e¢ cient policy frontier. Combining the IS with the aggregate supply schedule and the optimal policy under discretion returns the locus of points that characterize how the unconditional variances of output and in ‡ation vary with Central Bank preferences, as indexed by %. Figure 6 portrays the e¢ cient policy frontiers for the two alternative scenarios under the calibration considered in the previous section.
Insert Figure 6 here
The graph clearly shows that in the expansionary state monetary policy can reach a policy frontier which is instead infeasible under the contractionary one. During contractions an aggressive monetary stance on in ‡ation, i.e. a policy that aims at completely o¤setting ‡uc-tuations in in ‡ation incurs into relatively higher costs in terms of output volatility. However, attaching increasing importance to output volatility gradually leads to similar costs in terms of in ‡ation volatility across di¤erent states. A perhaps more important observation is that decreasing output variability by the same amount in contractions and expansions entails a lower increase in in ‡ation volatility in the …rst case. This can be readily noticed by picking a point on both frontiers at the same level of y , thus moving down along each locus so as to attain an analogous reduction in output variability: the relative increase in , which is measured on the x-axis, is greater under expansions than contractions. Therefore, pursuing a decrease in output variability as a policy objective should be rather done during economic slowdowns, so has to exploit a lower pass-through from output to in ‡ation and trigger lower pressures in terms of in ‡ation volatility, provided that the Central Bank aims at remaining on the policy frontier.
Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a novel explanation of the vast empirical evidence showing that output and prices react asymmetrically to monetary policy innovations over contractionary and expansionary phases of the business cycle. We use a piecewise linear VAR to show that monetary policy has stronger e¤ects on the U.S. GDP during contractions, as compared to expansions. As to prices, their response is not statistically di¤erent across di¤erent stages of the cycle.
These facts are consistent with a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring external habit formation in consumption in which we embed reference-dependent preferences: households' utility partly depends on deviations of their consumption from a reference level below which switching to di¤erent preferences takes place. In line with the theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) An obvious step is to explore the state-dependent trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilization that naturally arises in this context. Optimal policy under discretion imposes a higher degree of reactiveness to the expected rate of in ‡ation in the expansionary state as compared to the contractionary one, the reason being that during contractions an aggressive monetary stance on in ‡ation, i.e. a policy that aims at completely o¤setting ‡uctuations in in ‡ation, incurs into relatively higher costs in terms of output volatility.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst application of reference-dependent preferences over consumption in a dynamic general equilibrium perspective. This modeling device has already proven to be a useful extension of the consumption-based asset pricing model (CAPM) in various studies (e.g., Barberis et al., 2001) . Importantly, we show how loss aversion in consumption utility can also be useful at reconciling the otherwise standard DSGE workhorse with the widespread evidence on the asymmetric e¤ects of monetary policy over di¤erent stages of the business cycle.
It must be stressed that we have focused on a necessarily simpli…ed model in which the mechanism of switching between di¤erent states follows an exogenous process. 29 Notes: the …gure also displays the 90% con…dence bands (the shaded areas) based on the other percentile bootstrap method (Hall, 1992) . APPENDIX A: Log-linear State-Dependent System.
The IS Curve
We start by reporting the Euler equation consistent with each of the four cases:
i¤ fs it = Bg \ fs it+1 = Bg ;
where H it = C it =X it . After log-linearizing around H = 1 we obtain the following statedependent system of linearized IS curves: 1+ ( where we have aggregated across individuals (imposing homogeneity) and used the goods market clearing condition, Y t = C t .
When it comes to linearize the model economy in the neighborhood of C=X = 1, it is important to note that 0 (Z) presents an ordinary double point at Z = 0. As such, 0 (Z) is not purely di¤erentiable in that point, as also implied by property (i). Therefore, standard linear approximation techniques such as the Taylor expansion do not immediately apply in this case.
However, we can resort to a …rst-order approximation of 0 (Z) by computing an a¢ ne global underestimator, thus determining the subgradients of the marginal utility function at Z = 0.
A subgradient determines a support hyperplane to the graph of the function under scrutiny. In such a case the corresponding subdi¤erential is a direct generalization of the di¤erentiable case.
For a convex and non necessarily di¤erentiable function f : R n ! R, the subdi¤erential at x 0 is de…ned as @f (x 0 ) = fg 2 R : f (x) f (x 0 ) + hg; x x 0 ig. Thus, g 2 f (x 0 ) is subgradient in x 0 . 30 In our case it is straightforward to notice that at Z = 0 there will be a single subgradient A (Z) for Z 2 R . Hence, our approach corresponds to a piece-wise linear approximation in the neighborhood of Z = 0. Notice also that assuming a smooth gainloss function (Z) at Z = 0 allows us to obtain a continuous …rst derivative function, which improves the approximation around the point Z = 0, compared to what would happen, say, with a linear gain-loss function, which implies a discontinuity at 0 (0). This is done by constraining the coe¢ cient in the exponential part of the left-hand branch of the gain loss function to be = rather than . This assumption also allows us to implicitly consider loss aversion under its strong formulation, as explained by Wakker and Tversky (1993) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005) , meaning that 0 ( Z) > 0 (Z), 8Z > 0.
In ‡ation Dynamics
After applying some trivial algebra we retrieve a log-linearized expression for the real marginal cost:
( + 1 + (1 ) ) c t (1 ) c t 1 (1 + ) z t i¤ s t = A + 1 (1 ) c t + (1 ) c t 1 (1 + ) z t otherwise
:
Thus the piece-wise linear NKPC reads as:
( + 1 + (1 ) ) y t (1 ) y t 1 (1 + ) z t i¤ s t = A + 1 (1 ) y t + (1 ) y t 1 (1 + ) z t otherwise ; where:
APPENDIX B: Setting the Model into the Form of Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2008, 2009) .
We now can write the model reported above into canonical form in the following compact form: is the vector of variables to solve for and u t denotes a log-stationary cost-push shock. Also, After writing the model in the following form we can report the matrices A t and B t containing parameters that are possibly regime dependent:
y t = 1 ( t ) E t y t+1 + 2 ( t ) y t 1 3 ( t ) (i t E t t+1 ) ; t = ' f E t t+1 + ' b t 1 + 1 ( t ) y t + 2 ( t ) y t 1 (1 + ) z t + u t ; i t = r R i t 1 + (1 r R ) r t + (1 r R ) r Y y t + t ;
where: ; 3 ( t = 4) = 1 1 (1 ) (1 + ) ; 1 ( t = 1) = 1 ( t = 2) = ( + 1 + (1 ) ) ; 1 ( t = 3) = 1 ( t = 4) = + 1 (1 ) ; 2 ( t = 1) = 2 ( t = 2) = (1 ) ; 2 ( t = 3) = 2 ( t = 4) = (1 ) :
Consequently:
A ( t ) 
